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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of the relationship between 
entrepreneurship university spin-off activity and economic growth. It 
suggests the need for a diversified university structure, and that spin-offs are 
a misleading measure of the most important activity for technology transfer 
which remains the training and education of highly qualified scientists and 
technologists. It argues that a linear approach to the innovation process 
positioning basic science at one end of a chain and commercialization at the 
other is misleading.  The reality is more complex and incorporates important 
areas of activity where consideration of use and the pursuit of basic science 
go hand in hand. 
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper I wish to provide some reflections on knowledge transfer 
concerned with ‘innovative entrepreneurship’. This is potentially a very 
broad canvas, especially since the terms ‘innovative start up’ and 
‘innovative entrepreneurship’ are themselves imprecisely defined. There is 
certainly a large and rapidly growing literature on new knowledge based 
firms and their relationship with the science base. That literature and the 
lessons that may be drawn for policy have been the subject of several 
overviews at an international level (see e.g. OECD (2002) and for the 
Netherlands the references and discussion in van der Laag and Snijders 
(2003)).  
 
There is also an expanding recent literature relating to the institutional 
design and management of incubators and spin-off
1 programs, and their 
incidence and impact in Europe and the OECD generally
2. It is therefore 
neither useful nor possible to attempt a comprehensive review of that kind 
here, nor to provide a detailed assessment of Dutch policy in this area. 
Instead, I will be deliberately selective. I will reflect on three issues, which 
in my view have important implications both for policy towards university 
related new technology based firms, and for what growth outcomes may 
generally be anticipated from the kind of approach currently adopted in the 
Netherlands.  
 
The first of these three issues is the interpretation to be placed on the 
relative role and significance of new firms and high technology sectors in 
recent US growth and productivity performance, and its policy implications. 
The second is the lesson to be drawn for the relative importance of new and 
existing firms in productivity performance in general and across different 
technology based sectors from the growth experience of the OECD 
economies. My discussion draws on a number of recent studies based on 
decompositions of macroeconomic data for the USA and the OECD. These 
have, in my view, important implications for the scale and direction of 
effects we can expect from technology transfer policies targeted at new and 
small businesses in technology based sectors. The third issue is the policy 
implications that may be drawn for university based commercialization and 
spin-out policy drawing on the experience of the USA. This bears in 
particular upon the issues of attitudinal and cultural constraints on science 
industry relations in the Netherlands, which have been emphasized recently. 
It also bears on the incentive and institutional problems, which arise in 
attempting to devise policies to strengthen the links between industry and 
the science base (Muizer (2003)).   2
2.  Technology Transfer, Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth 
The strength and nature of the link between the growth of economic welfare 
and the development and exploitation of scientific and technological 
understanding has become a central theme in macroeconomic, industrial and 
technology policy discussions. At the same time there has been an 
increasing emphasis on the role which new technology based firms and 
entrepreneurship play in the technology transfer process (OECD (2001a) 
(2002)). These developments are closely related to the recent objective set at 
the European Council in Lisbon in March 2000 of the EU becoming the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, 
capable of sustainable growth, more and better jobs, and greater social 
cohesion. It is also reflected in policy analyses for the UK, the USA, and the 
OECD in general.   
 
‘The nation that fosters an infrastructure of linkages among and 
between firms, universities and government gains competitive 
advantage through quicker information diffusion and product 
deployment’ (US Council on Competitiveness (1998)) 
 
‘In an increasingly knowledge-driven global economy invention and 
innovation are critical to Britain’s long-term competitiveness. This 
requires a virtuous circle of innovation: from the very best in science, 
engineering, and technology in universities and science labs to the 
successful exploitation of new ideas, new science, and new 
technologies by businesses’ (DTI, H.M. Treasury, DFES, (2002)) 
 
“Young technology based firms play a key role in linking science to 
markets. Governments rightly attach priority to encouraging spin-offs 
from public research to stimulate innovation” (OECD (2002)) 
 
In the particular case of the Netherlands the emphasis upon technology 
transfer related activities has been reinforced, against this general 
background, by a series of evidence-based assessments of trends in 
entrepreneurial and innovation indicators and policies. (see e.g. Waasdorp 
(2002) Stevenson (2002)).  
 
These analyses reveal a holistic
3 approach to entrepreneurship and 
innovation policy in the Netherlands. It encompasses both policies aimed at 
individuals and attitudes, as well as policies aimed at companies and 
organisations in the public and private sectors. They also reveal that many 
of the conditions that are thought to be necessary for high levels of 
innovative entrepreneurship based on technology transfer are now in place.  3
Furthermore, on many relevant dimensions the Dutch economy benchmarks 
well against other EU economies. This includes, in particular, relatively 
high levels of public R&D expenditure, of patenting, and of scientific 
output, relatively positive nascent entrepreneurs’ attitude to failure, as well 
as relatively high levels of equity and venture capital, and of innovative 
output. The Netherlands, moreover, scores well in terms of the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey and interview-based assessments 
of the business climate for entrepreneurship. The same source suggests that 
entrepreneurial activity has held up relatively well in the Netherlands in the 
face of the global macroeconomic slowdown
4.  
 
Some evidence, however, points to concerns about technology transfer 
issues. Thus there is some evidence that in terms of human capital 
provision, the proportion of new science and engineering graduates per 
1,000 of the population is half that of the EU average and employment in 
high-tech and medium-tech manufacturing and high-tech services is below 
average, and about average, respectively compared to the EU (EU 2001). 
Lack of skilled labour is also identified in recent surveys as the major 
constraint for SMEs forcing them to rely on internal training Bosma (2003). 
Lack of marketing and management skills are also emphasised as spin-off 
constraints in recent research (Kreijen and van der Laag (2003). There is 
also some evidence that new start-ups in high growth sectors are relatively 
low by international standards (EIM (2001)).  
 
The GEM survey and interview programme produces some further recent 
results bearing on technology transfer. The GEM surveys for 2002 show 
that on average 3.5% of GEM key informants across their global sample of 
countries perceive knowledge transfer to be a weakness in the promotion of 
innovative activity amongst new and start-up firms, whereas 15% of key 
informants in the Netherlands do (Muizer (2003) p.6).  Similar evidence 
also raises concerns about equal access to, the cost of, and value of subsidies 
for technology transfer from public research centres and universities to new 
and growing firms in the Netherlands. Some concern is also expressed about 
the capacity to support world-class technology in at least one area. This 
evidence is primarily based upon attitudinal surveys of expert practitioners 
carried out as part of the GEM programme for 2001.  
 
It is worth noting that the differences with respect to the average scores on 
these issues for the EU countries are very small. The concern is more based 
on the scores given for this aspect of Dutch policy relative to other Dutch 
policy scores. (See e.g. Bosma, Stigter and Wennekers (2002) esp. Table 7 
p.42). Moreover other surveys paint a somewhat different picture. Thus the 
findings of the EU innovation barometer for 2001 show the Netherlands  4
with one of the highest proportions of firms reporting satisfaction with 
access to advanced technologies. It also shows Dutch firms as third most 
likely to collaborate with universities and to report the highest propensity to 
use intellectual property licensing as a means of accessing advanced 
technology (EU (2002)). Since the barometer survey excludes firms with 
less than 20 employees this suggests that such difficulties as have been 
identified may be size-specific rather than general across the SME spectrum.  
 
Finally Marcel Kreijen and Astrid van der Laag (2003) present recent 
benchmarking evidence on university spin-offs, which confirms the 
relatively low numbers of such activity across all countries and shows a 
small gap (in terms of average numbers of spin-offs per university year) 
between the Netherlands (6.4) and the international benchmark group (7.1). 
They argue that Dutch research institutions face constraints in developing 
spin-offs arising from shortages of start-up capital, and lack of physical 
space and of internal expertise to support spin-offs. They also stress the 
need for management and marketing competence in spin-off development. 
Finally they emphasise the absence of an ‘entrepreneurial culture’ and 
tensions between the commercialisation of knowledge and ‘the officially 
assigned task’ of universities.  
 
This may lead to perceived conflicts of interest as emphasised in Muizer 
(2003). He locates the root of those difficulties which do arise in ‘…an 
attitudinal problem of the ones who possess the knowledge’, and argues that 
‘A conflict of interests seems to be the main cause for the poor interaction 
between public knowledge institutions and companies’ and that this relates 
to a number of significant underlying causes. The first of these is identified 
as a conflict between the interest of scientists in autonomy in their pursuit of 
long-term fundamental, or basic curiosity driven research and the pursuit of 
directed short-term demand driven research for use in industry.  Second, a 
tension is identified between the desire to publish by scientists and the need 
for commercial exploitation based on exclusivity. Finally, it is argued that 
scientists place too much reliance on contacts with large as opposed to small 
firms in forging relationships and, as a result, there is a complementary lack 
of emphasis upon spin-offs and start-ups.  
 
Several policy approaches for the Netherlands have recently been suggested 
to resolve these problems. Thus Kreijen and van der Laag (2003) outline a 
new streamlined TechnoPartner strategy designed to raise the quality rather 
than the quantity of spin-offs, to use the education system to change culture, 
and to introduce the utilisation of research as a criterion when programming 
scientific research. Specifically policies are discussed based on seed corn 
funding for spin-off business plan writing and prototyping; state funded  5
guarantees for seed-phase informal and formal venture capital spin-off 
investment; business plan competitions and advice for institutions and 
individuals on start up activities. This will be combined with a patent fund 
to subsidise university patent management, and a programme to strengthen 
the incubator network in which access to subsidy is linked to curriculum 
development. Regional incubators will be the principal instrument for 
delivering the coaching and networking structures around institutions. They 
anticipate that this ‘is likely to lead in the short-term to a substantial 
strengthening of the Dutch economy on the one hand and improvement of 
the competitive position of the Dutch research institutions on the other’. The 
way in which research programming will be affected by considerations of 
usefulness is not spelled out but must be an important issue, given the 
claimed tensions between the needs of commerce and scientists. Indeed in 
Muizer’s view attitudes are the central problem. ‘The real solution therefore 
lies in the realisation of a change of attitudes’ (Muizer (2003)).  
 
I will return to the issue of the likely short-term impact of spin-off policies 
generally, and the nature of attitudinal conflicts and their resolution after 
discussing in turn the characteristics of recent US economic growth, the 
relative role of start-ups exit and entry in productivity growth and the nature 
of university industry relationships in the USA.  
 
In analysing university/industry links in the USA I will emphasise that a 
linear view of knowledge transfer, in which there is an essentially sequential 
process running from basic research through development to 
commercialization, is fundamentally misleading. It leads too easily to a 
sense of a zero sum game in which to favour basic science is to prejudice 
commercialization. It leads to an overemphasis on apparently tangible 
commercial interactions based on new business formation at the expense of 
other critical interactions with existing firms, through publications, shared 
laboratory space, consultancy, and most fundamentally the education and 
training of high quality graduates and doctoral students. As Kreijen and van 
der Laag (2003) note, spin-offs need to be seen in perspective, as one aspect 
of a multi-faceted integrated approach. 
 
3.  High Technology, Productivity and GDP Growth: Arkansas v. 
     Silicon Valley 
European policy concerns with the link between the science base, 
technology transfer, and entrepreneurship developments have been given 
particular impetus by the transformation of the relative growth and 
productivity performance of the US economy compared to the EU and  6
OECD countries in the last decades of the 20
th century. Particular emphasis 




A few salient facts may illustrate the kind of data upon which these 
emphases are based.  Between 1990 and 2000 the US economy grew at an 
annual average rate of 3.2%, compared with 2.0% for the EU 15 and 2.5% 
for the OECD 24 (OECD 2003). This was based upon faster productivity 
growth, which in contrast to the EU was combined with increased 
employment. By the turn of the last century high-tech value added as a 
proportion of manufacturing was 25.8% in the USA compared with an EU 
mean of 8.2% and the highest EU proportion of around 20% for Ireland (EU 
2001). 
 
It is worth looking at this performance more closely however.  A number of 
studies have revealed that the role of technology using sectors, and 
innovation in organisational and management techniques bear as close 
attention as the performance of the high technology generating sectors. A 
recent analysis by Robert Solow is instructive in this respect 
(www.cmi.cam.ac.uk/ncn/summit-2001-videos/solow/text.html). Solow 
points out that US growth in the nineteen nineties was dominated by events 
from 1995. Whereas real GDP growth per person hour was 2.9% from 
1947-1972, and 1.4 % from 1972-1995, it was 2.5% from 1995-2000
6. Thus 
the recent US performance in this respect is essentially a return to very long 
run trends.  
 
Above trend performance is focussed on a very short period (see also more 
generally on this point OECD (2003)). This should lead to some caution in 
attributing superior US performance in the second half of the nineties to 
specific cultural factors that might be expected to operate over longer 
periods of time such as a culture of enterprise, or attitudes to failure, or of 
small firm employment creation (which clearly predates this 
macroeconomic performance shift). It is also instructive to look more 
closely at the sectoral patterns behind the shift in growth performance to 
examine the role of technology based sectors in the 1995-2000 resurgence. 
 
The contribution that a sector makes in an accounting sense to overall 
productivity and output growth depends on its productivity increase and its 
employment size. The significance of a sector in employment terms affects 
the weight that its performance has in affecting overall economy 
performance. Solow disaggregates US real productivity growth 1995-2000 
between 59 sectors and shows that 6 of the 59 account for all of the  7
acceleration in productivity growth. The net contribution of the other 56 was 
zero.  
 
The top three were wholesaling, retailing, and security and commodity 
broking. The next three were electronic and electric equipment 
(semi-conductors) industrial machinery and equipment (computers) and 
telecoms. These latter three high-tech producing sectors contributed one 
third of the impact of the top three ‘low tech sectors’. From this perspective 
it is clear that the superior performance was not accounted for by 
developments in the high technology producing sectors per se. High-tech 
sectors to be sure had high levels of productivity growth and this accelerated 
in the late nineties but their relative size meant they played a smaller role in 
macro performance than is often claimed (OECD (2003)). From a 
knowledge transfer policy perspective this means that attention should be 
paid to the processes affecting productivity change in technology using as 
well as technology producing sectors. 
 
It is worthwhile, therefore, to look at the productivity dynamic that occurred 
in the lead sectors of wholesaling and retailing. In wholesaling, warehouse 
centralization and automation were based on ‘old’ IT. Scale gains and 
functional reorganisation were exploited in the face of competitive pressures 
from retailers. This was the so-called ‘Wal-Mart effect’. Based on an 
Arkansas family start-up Wal-Mart’s Market Share in retailing in the US in 
1987 was 9%, with a productivity advantage of 40% over its rivals. By the 
mid-nineties its share was 40%. From 1995-1999 competitors raised 
productivity by 28% but Wal-Mart’s productivity advantage rose to 48% 
(M.Schrage Technology Review March 2002 p.21). Its retailing productivity 
growth was based on scale effects in warehousing, electronic data 
interchange and bar code scanning. Productivity in the sector as a whole was 
driven by imitation, adaptation and organizational innovation by rivals. 
 
From this perspective Arkansas made a greater contribution to productivity 
growth than Silicon Valley, and organizational and management innovation, 
as much as technological change, drove the productivity dynamic. However, 
this is not really the most important point. The key lesson to be drawn is 
more general. Wholesaling retailing and financial trading are all sectors that 
use information technology developments. ITC users are more significant 
than producers in ‘accounting’ for productivity growth but they depend 
upon the former for their innovative inputs. The effective use of those inputs 
requires organizational innovation and embodiment of ICT innovations in 
user sectors. The demand for, and capacity to absorb, the output of high-tech 
producing sectors by technology users are crucial drivers of overall recent 
US performance, and the latter sectors have supplied the products with high  8
and rising efficiency. Thus investment in ICT goods and software is 
estimated to have accounted for 0.9 percentage points of US GDP growth 
1995-2000 (OECD (2003) p. 46). The ability to absorb and benefit from this 
investment depended upon the technical competence of management in 
recognising and implementing appropriate technologies. A supply push 
technology transfer policy (focussing on output and business formation in 
high-tech sectors) that neglects the importance of the management and 
technical competence of the firms on the demand side (domestic users) will 
be missing an important lesson. This lesson is that investment in physical 
and software capital and investment in human capital and managerial and 
technical skills are required. It points therefore to a broader educational, 
curriculum and training side of technology transfer policy for innovative 
start-ups, and for technology users. 
 
4.  Entrepreneurship, New Firms and Economic Growth: New Boys on 
     the Block versus Golden Oldies 
In contrast to the policy emphasis placed upon entrepreneurship, it is a 
striking feature of the macro-economic literature on the determinants of 
differences in economic growth that it very rarely mentions 
entrepreneurship per se. It is also a pervasive problem of the literature on 
the determinants of economic growth that there are so many potential 
explanatory variables, and so many missing data problems, that systematic 
analysis comparing alternative explanations is difficult to achieve. Thus 
Freeman (2001) points out that in one influential review 87 different 
explanatory variables are reported for testing on cross section samples of 
long term growth rates for around 20 OECD countries.  
 
In the case of adding entrepreneurship as yet another variable one key 
problem is how to define and measure it. Another is dealing with problems 
of causation. Are time series and cross section fluctuations in small business 
formation and growth a cause, or a consequence, of variations in economic 
growth over time, or across countries? Direct measures of entrepreneurial 
attitudes and activity have recently been developed as part of the GEM 
surveys. Development of better longitudinal datasets, of more direct 
measures of different entrepreneurial activity of this kind, may assist in 
econometric analysis of impacts on growth. Preliminary results along these 
lines reported in GEM (2002), however, reveal few systematic connections 
between entrepreneurial activity, entrepreneurial potential, or supporting 
framework conditions and growth (see esp. GEM (2002) p. 23 ff.). The 
GEM analyses are of necessity restricted to short periods and the authors 
acknowledge that more work needs to be done. A number of other studies  9
have sought to link proxies for entrepreneurship, such as small business 
shares, or self employment, to cross national variations in growth or 
unemployment rates and report positive links or links which imply adverse 
growth consequences if these proxies depart from estimated equilibrium 
levels (see e.g. Caree et al (2002), Audretsch and Thurik (2002))
7.  It is also 
possible to draw some broad conclusions about the significance of 
entrepreneurial entry for productivity growth using a recent programme of 
comparative international research carried out by OECD (OECD (2003)). 
This decomposes productivity growth over time for a country into effects 
due to new entry, exit, and the performance of survivors, respectively. The 
analysis covers the largest OECD economies for the periods 1987-92 and 
1992-97. 
 
Productivity growth in any period for a national population of firms can be 
decomposed into: productivity growth within firms that survive; reallocation 
of output between high and low productivity firms that survive; the impact 
of new entry; and the impact of exit. The research shows that these 
components vary across countries and industries but that the dominant 
component in labour productivity growth in manufacturing
8 is that which is 
driven by survivors, i.e. ‘golden oldies’ with high ‘within firm’ productivity 
growth. Thus the ‘within firm’ shares ranged between 55% and 95% in the 
eighties/nineties, with France, Germany and the USA showing the highest 
shares for this component. Exit and entry are highly correlated across 
industries within countries, and the net effect of this ‘churning’ accounts for 
20%-40% of labour productivity growth. The rate of churning is similar 
across the USA and the European countries.  The net effect of churning is, 
however, dominated by the exit of low labour productivity firms rather than 
by new entry. Reallocation of activity amongst existing firms is usually less 
important than the other three forces. 
 
New entrants, the ‘new kids on the block’, come and go with much less 
impact on productivity than improvements in ‘golden oldies’. On average in 
the OECD sample about 20% of firms in any year are new but only 40-50% 
survives for 7 years. Moreover, entry frequently has a negative direct effect. 
The negative effect of entry arises essentially from the low productivity 
performance of new firms compared with incumbents. A positive new entry 
impact is unusual with Netherlands and Italy notable in this respect. Most 
strikingly the new entry component for the United States is large and 
negative, and the ‘new kids on the block’ are smaller relative to the mean 
size of incumbents.  Moreover their survival rates appear to be lower. On the 
other hand those that survive grow faster in the USA than in Europe.  
  10
A number of other results are worth noting. First, new entry effects are 
bigger when productivity is measured over longer time periods, consistent 
with positive learning and scale effects as the new kids who stick around 
expand. Second, entry effects are bigger in information and communication 
technology sectors, in both manufacturing and services, where rapid 




This analysis has a couple of important implications for knowledge transfer 
policy linked to entrepreneurship. The first of these is that it is not entry per 
se but the subsequent survival and competitive expansion of new entrants 
that is important. A focus on barriers to post-entry growth is therefore as 
important as, or more important than, the generation of more new entrants, 
as such, in designing technology transfer and innovative start-up policy. 
Identifying and overcoming barriers to growth in productivity in incumbents 
is also important and will carry greater weight in industry productivity 
growth, not least because of their greater share of activity. Bridging gaps 
between incumbent firms, large and small, and the science base (i.e. the 
stock) yields potentially wider gains than focussing only on building new 
bridges through start-ups (i.e. the flow).  
 
The second broad lesson is that prospects for innovative new entry may be 
sector/technology specific and be stronger the longer the period they have to 
work themselves out. It follows that some sector differentiation in policy is 
required. New entry plays a more positive role in high-tech sectors and over 
longer periods. Superior performance through innovative new entry requires 
patience and is a long game. Moreover, in so far as new firm entry is 
connected with innovation in new products and processes, it is important to 
emphasise that it is a highly skewed world. In the highly regarded UK 
government SMART (Small Firms Award for Research and Technology) 
scheme, 80% of sales generated by award winners were produced by the top 
20% of award-holders. Equally, of the 20,968 active IPR licenses held by 
US universities that yielded $1.2billion of gross licensing revenues in fiscal 
year 2000 only 125 or 0.6% of the total generated more than $1 million each 
(AUTM (2002)). 
 
There is, of course, a substantial literature on barriers to innovation in small 
and medium sized firms, which can shed some light on why success on 
average may be hindered, and on the relative role of access to the science 
base. It is important in interpreting it to note how constraints may be 
contingent upon macroeconomic conditions. Thus, for instance, perceptions 
of barriers in relation to access to finance, skilled labour, or export markets 
are sensitive to monetary policy, labour market conditions, and exchange  11
rate movements. This is less likely to be a problem with the less contingent 
case of access to the science base. It is also important to note that whether 
access to technology is identified as a barrier may depend upon how options 
in survey questions are designed. Recent harmonised community innovation 
and other surveys have, however, asked directly about this issue and thus 
provide the opportunity to place some perspective on it in the EU. 
 
The first thing to note is that these surveys show that universities and public 
research institutes rank well below customers and suppliers as direct sources 
of new technological knowledge for innovation in innovating firms 
especially at the lower end of the size spectrum (Cosh and Hughes (2001) 
EU (2002)). The second point to note is that access to new technology per 
se ranks systematically lower than other constraints on innovation. Thus the 
EU-wide results from the 2
nd Harmonised EU Community Innovation 
Survey reported that SMEs experiencing constraints were more likely than 
large innovative enterprises to cite high innovation costs, difficulties of 
access to finance and the cost of compliance with regulation as the principal 
factors holding back innovation projects. Moreover, over 2/3 of EU SMEs 
cited skill shortages as an innovation problem (Cosh and Hughes (2001))
10.  
 
In the EU innovation barometer survey firms in all countries except the 
Netherlands cited human resources as the main unsatisfied need for 
innovation (EU (2002). Similar patterns emerge from the regular panel 
survey of the UK SME sector carried out by my colleagues at the Centre for 
Business Research (CBR) in Cambridge covering the period 1991 to 2002. 
In the UK case high-tech firms and innovators were generally more likely 
than conventional and non-innovating firms to feel constrained by a lack of 
management, marketing, and sales skills. The effect was especially 
noticeable in high-tech and innovative service firms (Cosh and Hughes 
(1996) (1998) (2000)). This strongly suggests that a policy focus on 
technology transfer needs to be embedded in a wider framework. That wider 
framework must address the capacity of firms that are encouraged to engage 
in knowledge transfer to be properly able to absorb, implement and exploit 
that knowledge and employ appropriately qualified staff.  
 
 
5.  Industrializing Knowledge, Spin-outs and Attitudes at the  
     University-Industry Interface:  the USA and Pasteur’s Quadrant 
 
The increasing role of public sector science in industrial development can be 
readily illustrated. In the late 1990’s it has been estimated that over 75% of 
references to scientific publications in US patent applications were to 
publicly funded science. Moreover the average number of US scientific  12
papers cited in US patent applications rose more than six-fold between 1985 
and 1998. The rise was particularly striking in biochemistry, organic 
chemistry, and medical and veterinary science (OECD (2002)).  Finally, in 
2000 over 450 companies based upon a university-licensed scientific 
discovery were formed in the USA, with over 80% of these founded in the 
state/province of the academic institution that created the technology. 
(OECD (2002), AUTM (2002)).  
 
The growth and productivity performance of the USA, the dynamism of its 
high-tech sectors, and the translation of that into inputs for transforming the 
performance of the high-tech using sectors has led to great interest in the 
links between the science base and industry in that country. Perhaps most 
strikingly in the case of the UK a policy experiment is in progress in which 
the government is funding a joint venture between the University of 
Cambridge and MIT specifically designed to develop and transfer aspects of 
US practice in university-industry collaboration into a UK context 
(http://www.cambridge-mit.org). It is worthwhile, therefore, looking at the 
situation in the USA, to see the extent to which it has been successful in 
addressing attitudinal and incentive issues and the policy implications that 
may be drawn. 
 
One of the most influential views of the nature of science-industry 
relationships in the U.S. in the post-second world-war period was set out by 
Vannevar Bush. Bush (Director of the war-time Office of Scientific 
Research and Development) in his report to the U.S. president proposed a 
strategy for US science-industry relations after the war which would both 
ensure substantial government resourcing for basic science and, at the same 
time, free basic science from government direction (Bush (1960)). Bush’s 
view was that national competitiveness would suffer if basic science was 
neglected because depending upon other countries for these advances would 
slow down US industrial progress. The assumptions behind his proposals to 
avoid this happening to the US have been succinctly summarised in Stokes 
(1997). In Bush’s own words these were that ‘basic research is performed 
without thought of practical ends’ and that ‘applied research invariably 
drives out pure’ if they are mixed.   
 
On the other hand ‘basic research is the pacemaker of technological 
progress’. Leave basic science to pursue its own agenda and, as Stokes puts 
it, it ‘will be a remote but powerful dynamo’ as applied research and 
development will convert discoveries into useful applications (Stokes 
(1997) p.3).  The ‘technology transfer problem’ on this view becomes one 
of defining appropriate institutions and incentive structures for stages along 
an essentially linear path from basic research through applied research, and  13
then through development and into production. Research is either basic or 
applied and a move towards one type means a move away from the other. 
Equally an emphasis in policy to emphasise use in funding strategies implies 
an interference with the curiosity-driven pursuit of fundamental 
understanding of the basic research scientist. The potential conflicts of 
interest between the needs of research users and those involved in basic 
research can then be seen as the manifestation of this separation. 
 
It has however been persuasively argued that this approach misunderstands 
the actual pattern of research activities. In particular it has been argued that 
a substantial proportion of university and publicly funded research has 
always combined both considerations of use and the pursuit of fundamental 
understanding. As a result the dichotomous approach in the linear model is 
misleading, both in terms of science practice and in terms of policy design. 
This view has been captured in the quadrant diagram shown in Fig.1 due to 
Stokes (1997). Here a distinction is drawn between research that is solely 
concerned with use, typified by the work of Edison, research that is solely 
concerned with fundamental understanding typified by the work of Bohr, 
and research that involves both, typified by Pasteur, which Stokes 




Seen from this perspective the problem for technology transfer policy can be 
perceived as having three broad components. The first is how to encourage 
recognition of the importance of Pasteur’s quadrant in scientific and policy 
discourse. The second is how to promote/support activity in Pasteur’s 
Quadrant by enabling scientific recognition of society’s concerns with 
particular areas of use as a stimulus for the pursuit of fundamental 
understanding in relevant areas. The third is how to encourage 
communication and interaction between quadrant communities. On this 
interpretation the success of the USA in industrializing knowledge is to be 
understood less in terms of specific policy initiatives to transform basic into 
applied research but in the ability of its university system to populate all 
boxes and enable interaction across them. 
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Figure 1.  Pasteur’s Quadrant  
Source: Stokes (1997) 
 
This ability has, in turn, been the result of the decentralized, competitive and 
regional structure of the system and its close coupling of research and 
graduate education. Moreover, the second world-war and the cold-war led to 
a massive expansion in federally funded scientific research in universities 
linking fundamental knowledge to potential use. These characteristics have 
led to historically diverse streams of funding, including high levels of 
industry funding, and a close relationship of universities with state and 
regional industrial research needs, most notably linked to the general origins 
and mission of land grant universities. The integration of graduate education 
with research has also led to the argument that the primary contribution of 
US universities to technological innovation is the human capital it produces. 
(See Branscomb et al (1999), Rosenberg and Nelson (1994), Feller (1999), 
Etzkowitz, (1999), Stokes (1999), Tornatzky Waugaman and Gray (2002) 
and National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges 
(2002) for an overview of relevant evidence on these points).   
 
These longstanding tendencies have received added impetus in the last 
quarter of the 20
th century from a series of policy initiatives concerned with 
raising competitiveness in the face of international, and especially Japanese, 
competition. These have included relaxation of anti-trust laws to enable 
research joint venture collaborations (e.g. the 1984 National Cooperative 
Research Act), policies to promote research on generic technologies  (e.g. 
the Advanced Technology Program established via the 1988 Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act, which by 2000 had 57% of its projects with 
university participation
12), increased National Science Foundation funding 














































 No  Yes 
 
Quest for Fundamental Understanding  15
Business Innovation Research Program. The latter mandates federal 
agencies to allocate around 4% of their spending to small innovative 
businesses and has had close connections with many university related 
spin-outs.  There has also been a series of court decisions strengthening 
intellectual property rights and the passing of the Bayh-Dole Patent and 
Trademarks Amendment Act 1980. The Bayh-Dole Act gave blanket 
permission for performers of federally funded research, including 
universities, to file for patents and grant licenses, including exclusive 
licenses, on the basis of them. Its purpose was to accelerate the 
commercialization of publicly funded R&D (on these developments 
generally see e.g. Branscomb et al (1999), Cohen et al (1998), Poyago et al 
(2003), Mowery et al (1999), Wessner (2001)). 
 
These developments were associated with a surge in university patenting 
and licensing activity, which coincided with the development in biomedical 
and biotechnological sectors that were naturally encouraging to closer 
scientific industry relationships
13. The ratio of university based patents to 
university R&D spend doubled from 1975-1990, and the top 100 research 
universities doubled their number of patents between 1979 and 1984, and 
again between 1984 and 1989. There was an explosion in the numbers of 
university licensing offices from 25 in 1980 to 200 in 1990 (Mowery et al 
(1999)). The number of US patent applications filed by respondents to the 
annual surveys carried out by the Association of University Technology 
Managers (AUTM) rose from 2,469 in 1991 to 9,925 in 2000, and licenses 
and options executed rose from 1,278 to 4,362 over the same period, 
accompanied by a rise in gross license income from $186 million to $1263 
million. The vast majority of the licenses yielding this income were 
exclusive. Even so by 1999 total gross licensing income was only around 
2.7% of the total R&D expenditure by universities.  
 
In the context of arguments that European universities may attract 
substantial sums of further research funding from this licensing income it is 
important to note the latter finding. This caution is reinforced by recalling 
the skewness of the returns to spin-outs and licensing, and the low 
likelihood of many universities making a major breakthrough from this type 
of funding (AUTM (2000)). The associated costs of staffing and 
administering technology licensing and related offices to the degree required 
mean that very small net income or ‘net losses’ can frequently occur, and 
where substantial sums do arrive they are associated with one or two big hits 
(Mowery and Sampat (2001) Trune and Gosling (1998)). 
 
In the context of arguments emphasising the importance of licensing and 
spin-offs as a means of transferring knowledge it is also important to note  16
that patenting remains significantly less important than other means of 
knowledge transfer. Thus in the view of leading scientists at MIT patenting 
accounts for less than 10% of knowledge transferred and exchanged from 
their labs and ranks well below graduate recruitment, consultancy and 
publication. This ordering of importance is shared by industry and other 
universities (Cohen et al (1998), Agrawal and Henderson (2002), Lester 
(2003)) and it underscores the importance of widespread personal and 
corporate interactions in facilitating knowledge transfer. Nor are spin-offs 
the most significant component of licensing activity. This is illustrated next 
by examining the relative role of innovative start-ups, existing small firms 
(with less than 500 employees), and existing large firms in US university 
licensing and spin-out activity. In doing this it is important to note that by 
statute licensors of inventions made with federal funding must show a 
preference for small companies.  
 
It has been estimated that AUTM licensing activity was associated with 
3,376 new start-ups between 1980 and 2000, of which 2,309 were still 
operational in the latter year
14. The number of such start-ups doubled 
between 1994 and 2000. In 2000 618 licenses were granted by universities, 
hospitals and research institutes to start-ups, 2002 to small firms and 1,346 
to large firms. Thus 51% of licenses granted were to small companies, and 
only 15% were to start-ups. Over 90% of the start-up licenses were 
exclusive, as were 42% of those granted to small firms, compared to 37% 
for large firms (AUTM (2002). In 2000 around 56% of the 454 start-ups 
which were reported also had an equity stake held by the university.  
 
Given the size of the US business population and the total number of 
start-ups (circa 500,000 per year), even in high-tech sectors, university 
start-ups are small in number. Moreover, start-ups are a minority within 
overall licensing activity. This general finding is true for the OECD as a 
whole (OECD (2001b)). However, the AUTM approach employs a 
conservative definition of a university start-up and ignores start-ups by 
alumni, or former students who deploy their human and intellectual capital 
in business start-ups not specifically linked to university patents. It is also 
important to note that an emphasis on start-ups also ignores the role that 
universities play more generally in terms of consultancy contracts, the 
provision of qualified graduates and postgraduates as employees for existing 
businesses, and as progenitors of businesses unconnected with university 
licensed activity (Branscomb et al (1999)). 
 
It is, nevertheless, of interest to ask which features lead to success in 
spin-off generation at the university level
15. In doing this it is important to 
recognise that indicators of success in this area are not well defined. The  17
number of spin-outs alone is insufficient because it neglects their initial 
scale as well as subsequent growth and survival. Equally the skewness of 
outcomes means that a portfolio approach to evaluation is necessary.   
Finally, even if relatively few spin-outs grow significantly, they can play an 
important transfer role through specialist consultancy (Keeble et al (2001), 
OECD (2001)).  There is clearly room for much more careful work here, 
nevertheless a number of interesting results have emerged.  
 
It appears that strong local formal venture capital markets and university 
based venture capital funds are not closely linked to spin-off formation and 
performance whilst more early stage informal venture capital may be more 
relevant. This may reflect in the first case the preference of the formal 
market for later stage investments, and in the latter case the need to ensure 
that the funds have clear and stable goals and adequately incentivized 
management (Di Grigorio and Shane (2003), Lerner (1999)).  
 
A clearly articulated and well understood university policy on licensing and 
IPR is also positively linked to spin-off generation. It also helps in the 
promotion of common understanding of its role in university activity (Di 
Grigorio and Shane (2003), Siegel et al (2001) and for the UK Lockett et al 
(2003)). The same is true of the extent to which licensing is combined with 
well managed equity support in early stage development of the spin-off. 
This helps address cash flow, licensing patenting and agency costs (Hsu and 
Bernstein (1997)).  
 
There is also evidence that spin-off activity is negatively related to the share 
of inventor royalties compared to industry licensees, and positively related 
to total industry spend on university-based research (Di Grigorio and Shane 
(2003)). Above all intellectual eminence and star status matter, and only big 
research universities can justify serious investments in spin-off support 
activity (see e.g. for the OECD, OECD (2001) and for Japan, Zucker and 
Darby (1998)). Moreover, there appears to be a clear negative link between 
university research intensity and eminence, and the relative  degree of 
involvement with local or regional development activity and smaller firms 
(for the UK see for example HEFCE (2003)). Moreover the contribution 
which spin-offs and industry university interaction can make locally or 
regionally is the result of a very long game (Link and Scott (2003)). It is 
also closely related to local or regional absorptive capacity. Spin-off push 
on its own is not enough (see for example Florida and Cohen (1999), and 
Fogarty and Sinha (1999)). 
  
Finally, it is important to note that tensions continue to arise in the USA 
between competing conceptions of the virtues of openness in science  18
discourse, and the apparent and real restrictions on scientific discourse 
which exclusivity in licensing patenting and spin-offs can produce. Tension 
also arises from the impact such activities can have on the direction of 
research activity. These tensions, of course, lie at the heart of many of the 
attitudinal issues raised by Muizer. Here there are relatively few research 
findings and the jury is still out. Much work remains to be done. Mowery et 
al (1999) in their detailed case study could find few direct indications of 
changes in research direction, whilst Louis et al (2001) and Blumenthal et al 
(1996) report greater secrecy and less disclosure over research findings 
amongst industry funded researchers. It does not appear, however, that such 
researchers are any less productive scientifically as judged by peer review 
(see e.g. Zucker and Darby (1996) and the evidence reviewed in Poyogo-
Theotoky et al (2003)). This is consistent with the role played by research in 
Pasteur’s quadrant. It could also reflect some selection bias in that the best 
scientists have the greatest opportunities to attract industrial support. 
  
6.  Concluding Remarks 
This brief set of reflections has been intended to place innovative start-ups 
and university spin-off activity in perspective and draw some possible 
policy implications.  
 
I have discussed evidence from a range of countries but have placed some 
emphasis on the USA. This was deliberate because there is little doubt that 
the experience of that country has loomed large in many policy discussions 
about the competitive challenges and policy options facing the EU and its 
member states. This is not to deny that a great deal can be learned from the 
sharing of best practice in the EU and the analysis of other country specific 
innovation systems. Indeed the discussion of the experience of the USA 
points to many issues (e.g. the scale of federal support, and the nature of the 
university system) which should caution against the notion of transplanting 
parts of any one system onto another. 
 
That said, the first general point that should be made is that an emphasis on 
technology-based industries as conventionally defined ignores the critical 
role played by technology ‘using’ industries. Economy level impacts of 
developments in a sector depend upon the size of the industries affected and 
not just their productivity growth. This is exemplified by the role of the 
wholesaling and retailing sectors in the USA. 
 
The second general point is that a key driver of overall productivity growth 
is productivity growth in existing firms. The direct effect of new entry is  19
considerably smaller, and university based spin-offs are a tiny proportion of 
overall start-ups. The impact of new entry is greater over the longer term 
and plays a bigger role in more technologically turbulent industrial settings.  
 
These two general points suggest that raising the rate of innovative 
university spin-offs is unlikely by itself to lead to major short-term shifts in 
macroeconomic performance. Moreover, the direct impact through the 
growth of such firms and the indirect effect they may have on technology 
using sectors depends critically upon management competence and 
organisational innovation. This points to the development of educational 
programmes in business schools which combine technical with managerial 
competence, and mobility of experienced managers across size classes of 
firms. Whether these should be characterised as courses in entrepreneurial 
skills is a moot point since they are in essence generic management and 
business skills applied in particular industrial and business settings. 
 
The third general point is that the notion of knowledge transfer as a linear 
process whereby basic science in pursuit of fundamental understanding has 
to be dragged through successive stages to considerations of use is deeply 
misleading. It ignores the many mechanisms whereby issues of use and 
fundamental understanding are jointly considered. It can also lead to too 
narrow a focus on ‘commercialization’ through patenting and spin-offs as 
the final stage compared to the many other dimensions of interaction 
through publication, consultancy and graduate education and recruitment.   
 
On the more specific issue of the process of university-industry interactions 
it is helpful to break away from the linear approach and to summarize the 
implications of the knowledge transfer process in the USA in terms of the 
interactions produced, the incentives to take part which are provided, and 
the institutional arrangements or structures in which they occur (see e.g. 
OECD (2002)).  
 
In institutional terms it is clear that the diverse decentralized and regional 
structure of the US university system has played a central role in enabling 
university/industry interactions and the populating of Pasteur’s quadrant. 
This has, however, occurred over a very long period of time. It is also the 
case that the scope for other countries to follow this path depends upon the 
structure of their own educational systems. The proposed attention to be 
paid in the new Dutch approach to the costs of patent management and the 
need to develop explicit rules of the game and clear expectations about 
commercialization are important in this respect. The impact of this ‘push’ 
aspect of policy will however depend upon the absorptive capacity of the 
firms (existing and potential) and regions at which it is targeted. This is  20
especially so given the correct emphasis to be placed upon quality rather 
than quantity of spin-off activity. It will also depend on the capacity to 
develop, in pace with the policy, a pool of suitably skilled and incentivized 
professionals to staff the activities. Developing university/industry 
interactions is a long game, and is not an area where policy should be 
expected to deliver short-term payoffs. 
 
The sheer scale of US federal expenditures, and the capacity to use that to 
drive programs to include start-up and SME involvement, has had a 
powerful incentive impact upon the involvement of these groups in 
technology transfer. The creation through public funds of research 
institutions specifically developing university-industry relations has also 
been a significant force. This points to the creative use of public expenditure 
programs to act as a powerful pull-through agent so that a high public R&D 
spend and a high share of public expenditure in GDP offer major 
opportunities for such activity (see also Metcalfe et al (2003) on this point). 
Mandating a proportion of such expenditures has clearly been an important 
component of the small high technology dynamic in the USA. It would be 
interesting to consider this aspect of policy further in the Dutch context 
given its relatively high share of public R&D expenditures. 
 
Spin-outs are an important but small and variable part of the overall range of 
ways in which the industrialization of scientific advance can occur. The full 
benefits of universities in enhancing the opportunities for innovative start-
ups, and the diffusion of innovation impacts through the economy, depends 
upon several dimensions of interaction. These include an engagement 
through the supply of a highly educated graduate labour force, as well as 
through the full range of dissemination activity including scientific 
publication, patents licensing and consultancy, and modes of cooperation 
including shared laboratory space, ‘user’ conferences and foresight 
exercises (Lester (2003)). Diffusion, moreover, depends upon absorptive 
capacity in firms and the ability of technology users to recognise and benefit 
from technological developments. Interactions with the stock of existing 
firms as well as the flow of new start-ups are essential.  
 
Finally it is clear that some questions remain to be answered about the 
impact on the direction and quality of university research of including 
considerations of use as a criterion in deciding upon funding patterns. The 
central point, however, is that it is essential to encourage interactions 
between academia and industry which encourage the joint recognition of 
activity in Pasteur’s quadrant as satisfying both the search for fundamental 
understanding and its interplay with considerations of use. This requires a 
major commitment to the full range of university/industry dimensions along  21
which knowledge transfer occurs. A perception that changing attitudes 
means a move by universities away from ‘basic’ to applied research 
focussed on the generation of patents, licensing income and spin-offs would 
be to reinforce an outmoded linear view of innovation. It will make the long 
road to an effective entrepreneurial society based on technological advances 




1   As van der Laag and Kreijen (2003) point out there is considerable 
imprecision in the literature about the definition of, and use of the 
terms, university spin-off and university spin-out. Where a specific 
source referred to in this paper uses one of these terms I have tried to 
use the same nomenclature, and where a specific definition is relevant 
I spell it out (e.g. in relation to data on US spin-outs based on 
licensing university based technology). In general the terms spin-off 
and spin-out are used interchangeably in this paper. 
 
2    For an overview of OECD spin-off activity see OECD (2001). 
Surveys of general university industry links in the UK are to be found 
in UNICO-NUBS (2002), CURDS (2001) and HEFCE (2003). EU 
(2002a) and UKBI (2000) and Clarysse et al (2002) provide a more 
normative assessment of good practice in spin-off and incubator 
management and design respectively. Siegel et al (2003) provide a 
concise overview of evaluations of the impact of science park 
location on business performance in the UK, (which is the most well 
developed country in this regard) and conclude equally concisely that 
‘The existing evidence suggests that the ‘returns to location on a UK 
science park are negligible’ (Siegel et al (2003) p.180).  They urge 
further research. For an assessment of incubators and their impact in 
an American context producing equally insignificant results see Di 
Gregorio and Shane (2003). 
 
3    It is of course easy for ‘holistic’ policies to become overlapping, 
inconsistent, and uncoordinated. In the UK a recent overview of 
enterprise support policy identified over 150 separate programmes 
that are to be consolidated into 15 or 16 new programmes. The 
intention in the Netherlands to consolidate spin-off support 
programmes in developing a new policy initiative based on the latest 
evidence as set out in van der Laag and Kreijen (2003) is therefore an 
excellent idea.  
 
4   Thus the EU Innovation scoreboard for 2002 shows that in terms of 
the ratio of total R&D to GDP the Netherlands was at 1.92% just 
above the EU average of 1.85% in a group including Denmark, 
Belgium and the UK. It was just below average in terms of private 
business R&D.  In terms of the ratio of public R&D expenditure to 
GDP however the Netherlands at 0.87% was matched only by 
Sweden and Finland in the EU and it outstripped both the USA and 
Japan. The harmonised community innovation survey also shows that  23
 
business innovation expenditures as a proportion of manufacturing 
sales were about average for the EU. The Netherlands was also the 
leading EU nation in terms of new capital raised in stock markets as a 
% of GDP and above average in terms of high-tech venture capital 
investment. The total of formal and informal venture capital as a % 
GDP in the Netherlands is second only to that of the USA amongst 
high GDP countries and only US and Sweden have more domestic 
venture capital funds but as with the UK this is focussed more on 
later stage and buy-outs than start-ups (Bosma (2003), EU (2001)). 
 
Innovation output performance matches those input measures that 
were above average. Thus European Patent Office high-tech patent 
applications by the Netherlands at 35.8 per million of the population 
was second only to Finland in the EU and outstripped both the USA 
and Japan. The Netherlands also ranked third in the EU behind 
Finland and Sweden in terms of US patent office high-tech 
applications. In terms of innovative capacity the EU innovation 
surveys reveal that Dutch performance for small firms is above 
average and somewhat better relatively than performance for its 
medium and larger firms. Netherlands scientific and technical journal 
article production is above average, and above both UK and USA 
(Muizer (2003) and EU (2001)). 
 
5   The role of clusters has also been emphasised for similar reasons. On 
the significance of clustering effects in economic growth and 
development see e.g. OECD (2001b), Porter and van Opstal (2001), 
and Porter and Ackerman (2001), and for a critical review of this 
literature as a guide to policy Martin and Sunley (2002). This general 
literature is not reviewed here although some attention is paid to the 
role of local spillovers in patterns of development in university- 
industry relationships.  
 
6   The same picture of a concentrated period of growth in the second 
half of the nineties emerges if the period 1972 to 1995 is 
disaggregated and allowance made for the nature of the trade cycle 
(OECD 2003). 
 
7   For example, Carree et al (2002) present a two-equation model to 
analyse the interrelationship between economy-wide business 
ownership rates and economic development. They apply the model to 
a data set of 23 OECD countries for the period 1976-96. Their 
entrepreneurship proxy is the business ownership rate, defined as the  24
 
number of non-agricultural business owners (both unincorporated and 
incorporated) as a share of the labour force (see Van Stel, 2003, for a 
description of the COMPENDIA (Comparative Entrepreneurship 
Data for International Analysis) dataset on which this analysis is 
based). In their paper, a hypothesized ‘equilibrium’ relationship 
between business ownership rate and stage of economic development 
(as proxied by GDP per capita) is estimated. They report a U-shaped 
relationship, which is negative for the larger part of the range of GDP 
per capita but with evidence of a positive relationship at the highest 
levels of GDP per capita. They also argue that countries that out-of-
equilibrium level of business ownership had a negative impact on 
economic growth, but experienced slow convergence to ‘equilibrium’ 
ownership rate levels.  
  
8    Similar results hold for services although measurement difficulties 
produce more variability across countries in the patterns observed 
(OECD (2003) p.136). 
 
9   In a similar vein Bosma and Nieuwenhuijsen (2000), for example, 
assessed the impact of churning on total factor productivity growth on 
a regional basis for the Netherlands. They found a positive effect of 
‘churning’ on total factor productivity growth for services industries, 
over a three-year time period, but no short-term impact in 
manufacturing industries. 
 
10   It is important to note that there are some variations in the firm size 
cut-off points used by countries in carrying out the CIS surveys. 
Whereas some countries include all firms, others exclude firms with 
less than 10 or 20 employees. So the results for some countries will 
exclude constraints reported by the very smallest firms (see e.g. Cosh 
Hughes and Wood (1998)).  
 
11   The fourth quadrant is left unlabelled by Stokes. It is not empty but 
contains research that for instance systematizes knowledge in an area 
(e.g. research producing ornithological field guides (Stokes (1997)). 
 
12   See for example Hall et al (2001) and Wessner (1999) for analyses of 
the AT Program and Grossman et al (2001) for a wider evaluation of 
academic research impacts on industrial performance. 
 
13   The precise role of Bayh-Dole in these trends is difficult to isolate 
because of the problem of establishing a good counterfactual.  25
 
Mowery et al in a detailed examination of the Universities of 
California, Columbia, and Stanford argue that the scale of existing 
university industry interaction had already led to licensing activity 
reinforced in biomedical areas by separate IPR court judgements 
(Mowery et al (1999)). Equally it can be argued that in one of the 
earliest most dynamic areas of patenting and licensing, 
(biotechnology) conditions were propitious for scientist entrepreneurs 
exercising intellectual ownership rights to exploit their discoveries 
because of their combined tacit and codified knowledge. In the early 
stages this ability rested with a small community of scholars who 
chose to stay with their academic institutions whilst developing the 
commercial possibilities of the science (Colyvas et al (2002), Zucker 
et al (1998), and Poyago-Theotoky et al (2003)).  
 
14    The AUTM use a conservative definition of a university-based 
start-up, which specifies that the start-up must be dependent upon the 
license from the institution for its formation (AUTM (2002)). It 
should be noted that there is some upward bias in the data quoted here 
because of increases in the number of institutions responding to the 
AUTM surveys. The AUTM also report results for constant samples 
that show the same broad trends reported in the text. 
 
15   There is a substantive literature on which types of firms or individuals 
succeed in spin-offs, which is not addressed here, see for example 
Shane and Stuart (2002), Levin and Stephan (1991), Roberts (1991), 
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